Larry -

NSC staff notes at paperclip.

While some may appear as editorial,

they are "confirming language" with

some Presidential speeches planned

to next two months. The middle

sort comments are emerging issues.

Thanks for the opportunity.

- [Name]

cc:

PP (Zal/Wade)

R&P (Dale/Dave)

Larry

Carol

SL (orig)
Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999 (U)

(U) This Defense Planning Guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union -- the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression -- the first post-Cold War conflict and a defining event in U.S. global leadership. In addition to these two great successes, there has been a less visible one, the integration of the leading democracies into a U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic "zone of peace."

(U) Our fundamental strategic position and choices are therefore very different from those we have faced in the past. The policies that we adopt in this new situation will set the nation's direction for the next century. Guided by a fundamentally new defense strategy, we have today a compelling opportunity to meet our defense needs at lower cost. As we do so, we must not squander the position of security we achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape the future security environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our values.

I. DEFENSE POLICY GOALS (U)

(U) The national security interests of the United States are enduring, as outlined in the President's 1991 National Security Strategy Report: the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure; a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; and a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

(U) These national security interests can be translated into four mutually supportive strategic goals that guide our overall defense efforts:

- Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever source, against the United States, its citizens and forces, and to honor our historic and treaty commitments.
The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, builds habits of cooperation, avoids the renationalization of security policies, and provides security at lower costs and with lower risks for all. Our preference for a collective response to preclude threats or, if necessary, to deal with them is a key feature of our regional defense strategy.

The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the U.S. and our allies. These regions include Europe, East Asia, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Latin America. Consolidated, nondemocratic control of the resources of such a critical region could generate a significant threat to our security.

The fourth goal is to reduce sources of regional instability and limit violence should conflict occur, by encouraging the spread and consolidation of democratic government and open economic systems, and discouraging the spread of destructive technology, particularly of weapons of mass destruction. To this end, we must encourage other nations to respect the rule of law and each other’s economic, social, ethnic, and political interests.

(U) To reach these goals, the United States must show the leadership necessary to encourage sustained cooperation among major democratic powers. The alternative would be to leave our critical interests and the security of our friends dependent upon individual efforts that could be duplicative, competitive, or ineffective. We must also encourage and assist Russia, Ukraine, and the other new republics of the former Soviet Union in establishing democratic political systems and free markets so they too can join the democratic "zone of peace."

(U) A collective response will not always be timely and, in the absence of U.S. leadership, may not gel. While the United States cannot become the world’s policeman and assume responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither can we allow our critical interests to depend solely on international mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different from our own. Where our allies interests are directly affected, we must expect them to take an appropriate share of the responsibility, and in some cases play the leading role; but we must maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those security problems that threaten our own interests. Such capabilities are essential to our ability to lead, and should international support prove sluggish or inadequate, to act independently, as necessary, to protect our critical interests. Moreover, history suggests that effective international, multilateral action is most likely to come about as a response to U.S. leadership, not as an alternative to it.
(U) We cannot lead if we fail to maintain the high quality of our forces as we reduce and restructure them. As a nation we have never before succeeded in pacing reductions without endangering our interests. We must proceed expeditiously, but at a pace that avoids breaking the force or sending misleading signals about our intentions to friends or potential aggressors. An effective reconstitution capability is important as well, since it signals that no potential rival could quickly or easily gain a predominant military position.

(U) At the end of World War I, and again to a lesser extent at the end of World War II, the United States as a nation made the mistake of believing that we had achieved a kind of permanent security, that a transformation of the security order achieved through extraordinary American sacrifice could be sustained without our leadership and significant American forces. Today, a great challenge has passed; but other threats endure, and new ones will arise. If we reduce our forces carefully, we will be left with a force capable of implementing the new defense strategy. We will have given ourselves the means to lead common efforts to meet future challenges and to shape the future environment in ways that will give us greater security at lower cost.

II. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (U)

A. Regional Focus (U)

(U) The demise of the global threat posed by Soviet Communism leaves America and its allies with an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater ease a security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. We can shift our defense planning from a focus on the global threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to a focus on the less demanding regional threats and challenges we are more likely to face in the future. In this way, we can work to shape the future environment and to preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to us. This same approach will also work to preclude the emergence of a hostile power that could present a global security threat comparable to the one the Soviet Union presented in the past. In so doing we can provide the underpinnings of a peaceful international order in which nations are able to pursue their legitimate interests without fear of military domination.

(U) In this more secure international environment there will be enhanced opportunities for political, economic, environmental, social, and security issues to be resolved through new or revitalized international organizations, including the United Nations, or regional arrangements. But the world remains unpredictable and well-armed, causes for conflict persist, and we have not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force or intimidation to achieve their ends. We must
not stand back and allow a new global threat to emerge or leave a vacuum in a region critical to our interests. Such a vacuum could make countries there feel vulnerable, which in turn can lead to excessive military capabilities and an unsteady balance of one against another. If we do stand back it will be much harder to achieve the enhanced international cooperation for which we hope.

R. Underlying Strategic Concepts (U)

(U) The Department of Defense does not decide when our nation will commit force. However, decisions today about the size and characteristics of the forces we are building for tomorrow can influence whether threats to our interests emerge and, if they do emerge, whether we are able to decisively defeat them. Four concepts illustrate this relationship.

(U) Planning for Uncertainty. An unavoidable challenge for defense planners is that we must start development today of forces to counter threats still so distant into the future that they cannot be confidently predicted. Events of the last few years demonstrate concretely how quickly and unexpectedly political trends can reverse themselves. Our ability to predict becomes even worse as the time frame becomes longer.

(U) Yet decisions about military forces cannot be based on a short-term planning horizon. The military capabilities that we have today and the ones we will have for the next few years are largely the product of decisions made a decade ago. Much of the capability that we are eliminating now cannot be restored quickly, and cuts that are precipitous will do long-lasting damage even to the capabilities that remain. Thus, even if we had great confidence in our projections of the security environment for the next two or three years, we should not base defense planning on such a relatively short time horizon.

(U) We are building defense forces today for a future that is particularly uncertain, given the magnitude of recent changes in the security environment. Fundamentally, we are striving to provide a future President with the capabilities five, ten or fifteen years from now to counter threats or pursue interests that cannot be defined with precision today.

(U) Shaping the Future Security Environment. America cannot base its future security merely on a shaky record of prediction or even a prudent recognition of uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks as well to help shape the future. Our strategy is designed to anticipate and to encourage trends that advance U.S. security objectives in the future. This is not simply within our means; it is critical to our future security.

(U) The containment strategy we pursued for the past forty years successfully shaped the world we see today. By our refusal to be intimidated by Soviet military power, we and our allies molded a...
world in which Communism was forced to confront its contradictions. Even as we and our allies carried the defense burden required in the Cold War, democracy was able to develop and flourish.

(U) One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying long standing alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we act separately, many other problems could result. If we can assist former Warsaw Pact countries, including republics of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine, in choosing a steady course of democratic progress and reduced military forces subject to responsible, civilian democratic control, we will have successfully secured the fruits of forty years of effort. Our goal should be to bring a democratic Russia and the other new democracies into the defense community of democratic nations, so that they can become a force for peace not only in Europe but also in other critical regions of the world.

(U) Cooperative defense arrangements enhance security, while reducing the defense burden for everyone. In the absence of effective defense cooperation, regional rivalries could lead to tensions or even hostilities that would threaten to bring critical regions under hostile domination. It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance. As in the past, such struggles might eventually force the U.S. at much higher cost to protect its interests and counter the potential development of a new global threat.

(U) Maintaining highly capable forces is critical to sustaining the U.S. leadership with which we can shape the future. Such leadership supports collective defense arrangements and precludes hostile competitors from challenging our critical interests. Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other nations confidence that we will use our significant military power only as a force for peaceful democratic progress.

(U) **Strategic Depth.** America's strategic position is stronger than it has been for decades. Today, there is no global challenger to a peaceful democratic order. There are no significant hostile alliances. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world remain our friends. The threat of global, even nuclear war, once posed by massive Warsaw Pact forces poised at the inner German border, first receded hundreds of miles east and has since transformed into the promise of a new era of strategic cooperation.
(U) Not only has our position improved markedly with respect to the passing of a global challenge, but our strategic position has improved in regional contexts as well. Today, no region of the world critical to our interests is under hostile, nondemocratic domination. Near-term threats in critical regions are small, relative to our capabilities and those of our friends and allies. Soviet Communism no longer exacerbates local conflicts, and we need no longer be concerned that an otherwise remote problem could affect the balance of power between us and a hostile global challenger. We have won great depth for our strategic position.

(U) In this regard, it is important to note the effect on our strategy of the fact that the international system is no longer characterized by Cold War bi-polarity. The Cold War required the United States and its allies to be prepared to contain the spread of Soviet power on a global basis. Developments in even remote areas could affect the United States' relative position in the world, and therefore often required a U.S. response. The United States remains a nation with global interests, but we must reexamine in light of the new defense strategy whether and to what extent particular challenges engage our interests. These changes and the growing strength of our friends and allies will allow us to be selective in determining the extent to which U.S. forces must be committed to safeguard shared interests.

(U) The first major conflict of the post-Cold War era preserved our strategic position in one of the regions of the world critical to our interests. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein kept a critical region from the control of a ruthless dictator bent on developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and harming Western interests. Instead of a more radical Middle East/Persian Gulf region under Saddam's influence, Saddam struggles to retain control in Iraq. Iraq's dangerous military has been greatly damaged, our ties with moderate states are stronger, and Arabs and Israelis have for the first time in many years met to discuss peace.

(U) Our strategy is designed to preserve this position by keeping our alliances strong and our threats small. Our tools include political and economic measures and others such as security assistance, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian aid and intelligence assistance, as well as security measures to prevent the emergence of a nondemocratic aggressor in critical regions. We bring to this task our considerable moral influence as the world's leading democracy. We can provide more security at a reduced cost. If a hostile power sought to present a regional challenge again, or if a new, antagonistic global threat or alliance emerged in the future, we would have the ability to counter it. But the investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we won through forty years of the Cold War are much smaller than those it took to secure this strategic depth or those that would be required if we lost it.
Continued U.S. Leadership. U.S. leadership, essential for the successful resolution of the Cold War, remains critical to achieving our long-term goals in this new era. The United States continues to prefer to address hostile, nondemocratic threats to our interests wherever possible through collective security efforts that take advantage of the strength of our allies and friends. However, sustained U.S. leadership will be essential for maintaining those alliances and for otherwise protecting our interests.

The sense that regional aggression could be opposed by the U.S. will be an important factor in inducing nations to work together to stabilize crises and resist or defeat aggression. For most countries, a general interest in international stability and security will not be enough to induce them to put themselves at risk simply in the hope that others will join them. Only a nation that is strong enough to act decisively can provide the leadership needed to encourage others to resist aggression. Collective security failed in the 1930s because no strong power was willing to provide the leadership behind which less powerful countries could rally against Fascism. It worked in the Gulf because the United States was willing and able to provide that leadership. Thus, even when a broad potential coalition exists, leadership will be necessary to actualize it.

The perceived capability of the U.S. to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor even in those cases where we do not actually do so. It will not always be incumbent upon us to assume a leadership role. In some cases, we will promote the assumption of leadership by others, such as the United Nations or regional organizations. But we will not ignore the need to be prepared to protect our critical interests and honor our commitments with only limited additional help, or even alone, if necessary. A future President will thus need to have options that will allow him to lead and, where the international reaction proves sluggish or inadequate, to act to protect our critical interests. In the end, there is no contradiction between U.S. leadership and our allies. Indeed, that is precisely why U.S. leadership is the necessary prerequisite for effective international action.

As a nation, we have paid dearly in the past for letting our capabilities fall and our will be questioned. There is a moment in time when a smaller, ready force can preclude an arms race, a hostile move or a conflict. Once lost, that moment cannot be recaptured by many thousands of soldiers poised on the edge of combat. Our efforts to rearm and to understand our danger before World War II came too late to spare us and others a global conflagration. Five years after our resounding global victory in World War II, we were nearly pushed off the Korean peninsula by a third rate power. We erred in the past when we failed to plan forces befitting our role in the world. And we paid dearly for our error.

Our defense program for FY 1994-1999 must provide the ready forces, the mobility, the forward presence and strength to...
launch remains and may actually increase through this decade. The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made ballistic missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept. We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves and our forward deployed forces, but also to have the ability to extend protection to others. Like “extended deterrence” provided by our nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of “extended protection” for friends and allies and further strengthen a democratic security community. This is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, we are seeking to move toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles. The need to deploy missile defenses will also be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses undermine the military utility and thus the cost effectiveness of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles.

In the decade ahead, we must adopt the right combination of deterrent forces, tactical and strategic, while creating the proper balance between offense and active defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, whatever the source. For now this requires retaining ready forces for a secure nuclear deterrent, including tactical forces. In addition, we must complete needed offensive modernization and upgrades. These offensive forces need to be complemented with early introduction of limited ballistic missile defenses.

Forward Presence. Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the United States has been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition. The role that forward presence plays in the regional defense strategy is outlined in the paragraphs below. Regionally-specific policy issues are treated in detail in Part III, "Regional Goals and Challenges." Programmatic guidance on the subject is given in Part IV.

We should plan to continue a wide range of forward presence activities, including not only overseas basing of forces, but prepositioning and periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges or visits. Forward basing of forces and the prepositioning of equipment facilitate rapid reinforcement and enhance the capability to project forces into vital strategic areas.
We will continue to encourage In particular to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently their defensive capabilities to deal with threats they face and to assume a greater share of financial support for U.S. forward deployed forces that contribute to their security. Contributions in securing maritime approaches is one example. We will also persist in efforts to ensure an equitable, two-way flow of technology in our security cooperation with advanced allies such . We must plan to continue to safeguard critical SLOCs linking us to our allies and trading partners.

(U) The East Asia Strategy Initiative of April 1990 remains the framework for adjustments to our forward-deployed forces in the region. Because our Pacific friends and allies are assuming greater responsibility for their defense, we can restructure our forces and reduce the number of ground and support forces forward deployed there. As Phase I of our planned withdrawals we anticipate that more than 25,000 troops will be withdrawn from bases in East Asia by December 1992. This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines. Plans to remove additional forces from have been suspended while we address the problem posed by In time we will look to implement Phases II and III of the East Asia Strategy Initiative, with the objective of keeping substantial forces forward deployed in Asia for the foreseeable future.

Despite recent positive trends toward political liberalization and market-oriented economic reforms, the East Asia and Pacific region continues to be burdened by several legacies of the Cold War: the Soviet annexation of the Northern Territories, the division of the Peninsula, and the legacy of Communism in Europe is likely to bring pressure on remaining Communist regimes with unknown consequences for regional stability. We should continue to pursue the opening but also should ensure that has the modernized armaments needed to defend itself as provided by the

Our most active regional security concern remains the conventional military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. Although we have begun some reductions in our forces as part of shifting greater responsibility to our ally, we must maintain sufficient military capabilities together with the Republic of Korea to deter aggression by the North or to defeat it should deterrence fail. Our overall objective with regard to the Korean peninsula is to support its peaceful unification on terms acceptable to the Korean people. We should plan to maintain an alliance relationship with a unified democratic Korea.

(U) The emergence of ASEAN as an increasingly influential regional actor has been an important positive development.
will increase our presence compared to the pre-crisis period. We will want to have the capability to return forces quickly to the region should that ever be necessary. This will entail increased prepositioning of equipment and materiel, improved transport aircraft, control, and communications; and a robust naval presence. We will also strengthen our bilateral security ties and encourage active regional collective defense.

(U) We can strengthen stability throughout the region by maintaining and improving the self-defense capabilities of other regional friends. The United States is committed to the defense of other regional friends. The United States is committed to the development of a robust presence of U.S. military forces in the region to bolster the collective defense and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to our ability to prevent threats to our security and interests. This is to contribute to the stability in the entire region, as demonstrated earlier. At the same time, our assistance to our friends to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region, including for our friends.

(U) We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable our regional friends to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.

(U) We will build on existing bilateral ties and negotiate multilateral agreements to enhance military access and prepositioning arrangements and other types of defense cooperation. These protocols will strengthen and broaden the individual and collective defense of friendly states.

(U) The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the potential danger from future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons and reverse the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

(U) We will seek cooperative relations with friendly states to moderate tensions between them and to prevent the further development of an arms race on the subcontinent. In this regard, we should work in South Asia.
(U) The presence of drug production and trafficking and instances of international terrorism complicates our relations with regional countries. We will contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives and support the efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade.

D. Latin America and the Caribbean (U)

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States seeks to sustain the extraordinary democratic progress of the last decade and maintain a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of U.S. security policy is assisting democratic consolidation and the efforts of the democratic nations in the region to defend themselves against the threat posed by insurgency and terrorism and foster democratic consolidation. In addition, the United States must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit drugs, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

\( \text{(U)} \) Absent a change in regime, Cuba will pose an area of special concern for the United States throughout the 1990s. Despite Cuba's rapid economic decline, Castro will retain the hostile intent that has for decades sought to undermine democratic progress in Central and South America and a disproportionately large military which, despite declining readiness, could threaten regional stability. Cuba's growing domestic crisis holds out the prospect for positive change, but over the near- to mid-term, Cuba's tenuous internal situation could generate new challenges to U.S. policy.

\( \text{(U)} \) The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we seek the successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we seek to strengthen their democratic institutions. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet U.S. responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.

\( \text{(U)} \) The small island-states of the eastern Caribbean remain vulnerable to destabilization. We should explore ways of strengthening the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System and assist it in improving.

\( \text{(U)} \) We will face new difficulties maintaining a ground presence in Latin America. Following implementation of the Panama Canal treaty, we will have no permanent bases on the Latin America mainland. The general trend toward democratization and peace in...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/COVER BRIEF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

SUBJECT: Excess Equipment Stocks and Future "Lend-Lease" Options

PURPOSE: INFORMATION--To discuss a reference in the Defense Planning Guidance that suggests that excess equipment stocks retained for possible force expansion under reconstitution might also be used.

Reviewed by:

PDUSD/S&R

ADUSD/R&P

Prepared by: Andrew R. Hoehn, OPDUSD/S&R, x79478

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.

E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 2008-002, document 2

SECRET/NOFORN — CLOSE HOLD

SECRET/NOFORN — CLOSE HOLD

07-MY-928-A1
The DPG programming guidance directs the Services to "program for—or alternatively, itemize and cost in a POM addendum—assets to enable reconstitution of ... combat capable forces ...." This guidance intends for the Services to maintain "cadre-type" units, or production restart capacity for current systems, or to consider long-term storage or "mothballing" of combat vehicles, airplanes, and ships leaving the force. We expect this form of "smart layaway" to be a low-cost hedge against future reconstitution threats. If relatively near-term force expansion were required we will have made best use of our earlier investments by preserving the option to build forces around what, in most cases, is still modern and usable equipment.

Another factor that should influence our consideration of a smart layaway program is the idea that this same equipment could be used, in extreme conditions, facing a particularly urgent or unanticipated threat. In this case, assets that were set aside for purposes of reconstitution could be made available, this would provide us an instrument to influence or shape events by strengthening the military capability and thereby furthering deterrence. Perhaps more importantly it might ultimately help to preclude the direct involvement of American forces.

Our view of this concept is that we should not set aside more equipment than we might reasonably expect to use for our own reconstitution efforts. And we would want to be guarded in anything but very general references to the thought of a future arrangement could help to defuse an emerging situation, show our commitment to the concept of democracy and our unwillingness to accept aggression or military intimidation, and make productive, yet highly leveraged use of our earlier military investments.

The DPG Policy and Strategy section will make reference to this concept in the last sentence of the paragraph that follows:

We will plan to reconstitute with forces tailored to exploit new high-leverage technologies, operational concepts, or strategies; to exploit vulnerabilities unique to a
particular adversary or situation; or to reflect role specialization for the reconstitution threat. As we reduce our defense establishment, we have the unique opportunity to preserve selectively through such means access to selected long-lead elements of our capacity to rebuild that would also offer timely availability in the immediate future, if needed. These same assets might also be useful in providing timely support facing a greatly increased or unanticipated threat.

[S] We believe this is an important factor to bear in mind when considering the advisability of maintaining excess equipment in some form of We do not feel it is an argument to be used against judicious destroying or otherwise eliminating clearly outdated equipment. But it does strengthen the idea that there are various benefits to be gained from maintaining excess equipment stocks for potential reconstitution purposes.

Prepared by: Andrew R. Hoehn, OPDUSD/S&R, x79478
Possible Major Issues for SecDef/DepSecDef note

- **2 Brigades for possible**
  - **Pivotal to our ability to defend against absent other access**
  - **Military likely to object on grounds of warfighting risk, inflexibility, cost. (Would pay for equipment?)**
  - **Issue also appears in MRC-East scenario statement of objective**

- **Forward Presence, Navy/USMC (also Air Force)**
  - **New guidance to be able to maintain increased CENTCOM presence for long term (above CJCS August '91 message)**
  - **Navy/USMC may raise FERSTEMPO pressures (tacit end strength reclama, esp. USMC?), and flag resulting Europe presence cuts**
  - **Also dislike "explore...homeporting...and innovative presence"**

- **Total Force paragraphs**
  - **Rejects traditional "maintain as small an AC as possible..."**
  - **Aim of "minimize casualties..."; "assume callup when required"**

Separate background provided on:

- **6 "Pillars"**
  - **New formulation is sound, but may face general resistance**
  - **Order between Sustainability and R&D may be issue?**
  - **New "Infrastructure and Overhead" pillar may be red flag**

- **New Acquisition Approach**
  - **OUSD/A provided a rewrite, with less emphasis on change**
  - **Current draft instead draws heavily on DepSecDef/SecDef words**

Other Possible Issues (for USD(P)/PDUSD(S&R) to note for now)

- **Reconstitution target levels**
  - **Navy/USAF objected to draft as unstudied (stonewalling?)**
  - **Later ok'd equal or higher targets for stockpile scenario**

- **Sustainability days of supply levels**
  - **P&L raised for whole force in an earlier paper; then one scenario, for other units, for the DPG**
  - **DPG sticks with L as yardstick, like strategy/base force**
  - **Exact levels now affordable remain unanalyzed; DPG mandates a confident estimate as a floor, calling for more if affordable**

- **Test and Evaluation assets funding targets**
  - **OUSD/A input detailed 0% real growth, 15% cost reduction**
  - **Services objected; details were deleted; now USD/A may object**

- **Installations Investment**
  - **Services object to denying MilCon for bases likely to close; say appears to prejudge Base Closure process**
  - **DASD/F&I, GenCounsel staff say guidance consistent with law**
  - **R&P reading sees guidance as both prudent and legal**
MEMO FOR Mr. Libby

SUBJECT: New Policy Directions in DPG

S铮ter:

Attached is a comprehensive set of excerpts indicating where the DPG draft sets new policy directions.

General Vessen reviewed this last night.

Dave

A "T" in right margin indicates similar language was in the Chief's testimony.

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 2006-003, document 4
New Policy Directions
Noted in Draft Defense Planning Guidance

Policy and Strategy Section

• Preclude hostile, nondemocratic domination of regions [Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf] critical to our interests, and thereby strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat (pp. 3 and 12; see also pp. 19, 31, and 39).

• Lead to a security community that extends to all peace-loving nations, including the new democracies of Eastern Europe and a democratic Russia, Ukraine, and other democracies of the former Soviet Union (p. 3; see also pp. 7, 32 and 33).

• It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance (p. 8).

• The demise of the Soviet Union and the increasing strength of our allies permit us to define our regional interests selectively and to safeguard those interests in separate regional contexts and at lower resource levels (p. 11).

• A future President will need to have options that will allow him to lead or, where prudent and practical, to act to protect our critical interests even in cases where very few others are with us. We must plan sufficient forces and programs within current fiscal constraints to provide such options... (p. 12).

• A critical task will be to begin preparing for tomorrow’s [core] competencies, while gaining an appreciation of those we need no longer emphasize (p. 17).

• U.S. forces must continue to be at least a generation ahead in those technologies which will be decisive on future battlefields. Future generations must have at least the same qualitative advantages over their opponents as our forces did in the Gulf War (p. 18).

• We need to be able to fight future forces through simulation before we buy them (p. 18).

• Our strategic nuclear forces...provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat (p. 20).
...examine more innovative ways of providing strategic deterrent forces...We might also find ways of ensuring that some of our...Further, we should find methods of being more effective by going to lower alert levels for some portions of the force... (p.21).

- [We must explore] new ways of operating [forward presence] forces in peacetime...
- We might also consider increased use of Reserve Component units overseas, additional homeporting...

- Our forces must remain able to respond rapidly to a second major regional crisis or to expand an initial crisis deployment in the event of escalation... (p.27). (First time specific guidance on second major regional contingency to be given in unclassified context.)
- Mobility: forces must be capable of accomplishing a major force deployment within current planning parameters... (p.29).

- Reconstitution now focuses on a 7-8 year warning time, and drops the exclusive focus on, but still notes the valuable "hedging" opportunities now available (p.30).
- Our challenge is to maintain our collective capacity to defend against an aggressive regime in such a way that we do not disrupt future cooperation with a democratic state or weaken the chances of successful reform (p.33).
- Our policy should encourage the broadening of European institutions to include the democracies of Eastern Europe (p.35).

SECRET/NOT FOR RELEASE --- CLOSED BOLD
We should encourage the [REDACTED] states to play a positive role in stability and democratic consolidation.

While continuing the opening, the United States should also have the means to defend itself. In this sense, the U.S. should enforce the [REDACTED] and provide [REDACTED] with modernized armaments to be used in its defense (p.37).

**Programming Section**

- Strategic forces guidance requires and addendum to the Service POMs detailing the changes that would be required if [REDACTED] accepts PNI II proposals (p.2).

- Forward presence guidance adjusts the levels approved last summer to retain more robust CentCom presence, and requires a [REDACTED] of naval presence requirements (pp.4-5; and p.3).

- Prepositioning guidance requires Army to retain another [REDACTED] brigades of equipment for possible future prepositioning, as recommended by [REDACTED].

- Sustainability guidance requires, for each of the two most demanding Major Regional Contingency scenarios, 1) "threat-oriented" munitions to kill [REDACTED] and 2) "level of effort" sustainment for [REDACTED] of operations (p.10).

- Reconstitution guidance sets force levels of reconstitution capability for the Services to provide at low cost through equipment stockpiles or production capability (pp.22-23).

Prepared by: Andrew Hoehn and Rod Fabrycky, x75475

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*SECRET/NOFORN --- CLOSE HOLD*
ISSUES IN THE POLICY AND STRATEGY SECTION

- Balance between U.S. acting unilaterally as opposed to within collective efforts (Issue in News accounts)
  
  - See bottom of pages 2&3 and page 7 -- "Continued U.S. leadership"

  - Current document emphasizes striving to act in collective context wherever possible but underscores that U.S. must retain ability to defend critical interests unilaterally and warns that significant U.S. capabilities and leadership will be necessary in many instances to actually put a coalition together

- Role of allies

  - To what extent should they increase their military capabilities? (See 3rd paragraph -- page 12 -- which by indirection says allies should not acquire nuclear weapons) (Issue in News accounts)

  - Do we seek alliances principally because we fear them as potential competitors or value them as current allies? (See second paragraph on page 5 that rejects balance of power)

  - Maintaining alliances is second goal on page 2 and we underscore that U.S. needs "leadership necessary to encourage sustained cooperation among major democratic powers." (next to last paragraph on page 2)

  - Their growing strength calls on them to accept greater responsibility (next to last paragraph on page 8 and middle of bottom paragraph of page 2)

- Importance of extending alliances to Eastern Europe

  - First paragraph page 5

- Issue of disarming capabilities to destroy

  [Withheld from public release under statutory authority of the Department of Defense. FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(5)]

SECRET -- CLOSE HOLD

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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 2008-003, document 5

SECRET -- CLOSE HOLD

01-21-1978 A1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Approval Draft of the Defense Planning Guidance
--ACTION MEMORANDUM

Attached for your approval is the Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994 - FY 1999. The document has been widely reviewed with all major issues resolved.

I recommend you approve the document and sign the memorandum of conveyance that appears next under.

Coordinated:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Prepared by: Dale A. Vesser and Zalmay M. Khalilzad

Unclassified when separated from attachment

Classified by: USD(P)
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET/NOFORN
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 7006-003, document 40
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Approval Draft of the Defense Planning Guidance
--ACTION MEMORANDUM

Attached for your approval is the Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994 - FY 1999. The document has been widely reviewed with all major issues resolved.

I recommend you approve the document and sign the memorandum of conveyance that appears next under.

Paul Wolfowitz

Coordination:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Prepared by: Dale A. Vesser and Zalmay M. Khalilzad

Unclassified when separated from attachment
Classified by: USD(P)
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET/NOFORN
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Defense Planning Guidance -- Major Comments Received(U)

(U) Attached is the full Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) document in two parts: TAB A is the final review version of the Policy, Strategy and Programming sections, which you have seen before. TAB B is the Illustrative Planning Scenarios Annex on which I still need to work a couple of issues with the Chairman. It is included here because it is an integral part of the DPG and in case you want to do an initial review.

(U) We have incorporated most of the comments we received from the Service Secretaries, Director, Joint Staff, USD(A) and ASDs into the DPG. In the attached draft significant additions and comments not taken are indicated by a footnote with a brief reference to the specific concern and interested party.

(U) There have been relatively few changes to the first half of the draft DPG. It is still a rather hard-hitting document which retains the substance you liked in the February 18th draft. If you have time you might want to read the first nine pages again to assure yourself on this point. (You may want to check the paragraph added on page 6 to meet a Joint Staff concern.)

(U) A few of the additions and issues should be brought to your attention here:

-- (U) SDI. On SDI we have noted that we are proceeding, "with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991." (pp.14 and 31)

-- (U) Six Pillars. To help identify our restructured programming priorities, we have shifted from the traditional four pillars of military capability to six pillars of defense resources. At Don Yockey's request we have retitled the two new pillars formed out of the traditional modernization pillar: "Science and Technology" replaces "Research and Development" in the previous draft and "System Acquisition" replaces "Procurement." (pp.29-30)

-- (U) Total Force Policy. The previous draft talked about maintaining military personnel in that component "in which they can effectively accomplish required missions quickly, with minimum casualties, and at the least cost." In partial response to a comment from Steve Duncan and after discussion with General
Powell, we have changed the text to read, "in which they can most effectively (including with minimum casualties) and most economically accomplish required missions." (p.31)

-- (U) B-2 Orientation. The summary of the Base Force does not list B-2s under nuclear forces but under "conventional bomber capability, including 20 B-2s." Don Rice supports this. (p.31)

-- (N) Navy Base Force. At the Navy's request the statement of its Base Force uses "about 150 major surface combatants and amphibious lift for 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades" instead of the public characterization, "..." (p.31)

-- (N/SC) Army Corps in Europe. At the Army's request and after discussion with the Chairman, we have changed language on a heavy corps in Europe from "retain" to "commit." This provides the Army some flexibility for programming below in Europe after FY 1995. (p.34)

-- (N/SC) SWA Prepositioning. As you will remember from the Mobility Requirements Study, I believe it is important to preserve the option to preposition an additional two heavy brigade sets to counter threats in SWA. The Army's comments indicated a preference for prepositioning on land vice afloat and suggested saying "in," retained the language "afloat," but edited to continue with, "or, preferably, on land at suitable sites." (p.35)

-- (U) Sealift. Various parties wanted more or less specificity for additional sealift. This draft sticks with the Mobility Requirements Study's designation of some elements of its recommendations as national and others as minimum criteria. A paragraph was also added to reflect Sean O'Keefe's concerns. (pp.35-6)

-- (U) SOF Guidance. This draft provides for SOF force structure at the end of the Crisis Response section. The proposed language is, "Program to maintain not more than the AC/RC force totals in the FY 93-97 President's Budget." (p.37)

-- (N) Reconstitution. Don Rice feels that rather than keep older aircraft mothballed in support of reconstitution, it is better to use them via FMS to strengthen allies and build influence. We agree FMS is important, and our best information suggests there will be ample aircraft for near-term FMS in addition to the level specified in the draft for "smart layaway" for reconstitution. (p.37-9) In addition, we raise in the strategy section the concept that our reconstitution assets could also prove useful to allies as the basis for a future "lend-lease" type support (although we do not use that term) in the face of a
large, unanticipated threat. (I am sending you a separate memorandum on this concept). (p.19)

--- (U) Transfer of War Reserve Stocks. Before disposal of current war reserve inventories that prove excess to the new sustainability guidance, we call for consideration of their possible utility for later... (p.42)

--- (U) Sustainability. The previous draft directed the Services to program for the 45 highest consumption days for the two most demanding Major Regional Contingencies (MRC). The current draft specifies MRC-East (Southwest Asia) and MRC-West (Korea) as the two contingencies to use in calculating sustainability for munitions, spare parts, fuel, etc. This responds to a comment from the Director, Joint Staff anticipating Congressional resistance to requirements based on a major contingency in Europe. He prefers to focus analysis on the more likely and more concrete scenarios. Although an MRC in Europe could be more demanding in many respects than MRC-East or West, the great uncertainty about many needed assumptions render it a questionable basis for deriving sustainability programs. (pp.41-3)

(U) I would note that the current guidance marks a considerable advance. Traditional formulations tended to call for 60 days of stocks for the whole force for global war. Our guidance focuses on the specific forces that have been deployed to and engaged for quick decision in the two specific regional contingencies. It also directs consideration of different levels of combat intensity in calculating stockpile size.

(U) David Chu feels we should use more meaningful measures than "days of supply" and would prefer to call for "adequate stocks to meet operational objectives." However, he offered no alternative measure. For threat-oriented munitions we establish a requirement to provide high confidence of destroying 1/3 of the threat targets. Further, we have adjusted the language to encourage programming... for the full operational requirement if resources permit.

--- (U) MILSTAR. This draft identifies MILSTAR as "a high C3 priority." Both Don Yockey and David Chu questioned mandatory guidance in the previous draft to treat MILSTAR as "the highest C3 priority." (p.48)
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Defense Planning Guidance -- Major Comments Received (U)

(U) Attached is the full Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) document in two parts. TAB A is the final review version of the Policy, Strategy and Programming sections, which you have seen before. TAB B is the Illustrative Planning Scenarios Annex. It is essentially final, but the staffs are still making some fixes, and I may need to work one remaining issue with the Chairman.

(U) We have incorporated most of David Addington's comments and those we received from the Service Secretaries, Director, Joint Staff, USD(A) and ASDs. In the attached draft significant additions and comments not taken are indicated by a footnote with a brief reference to the specific concern and interested party.

(U) There have been relatively few changes to the first half of the draft DPG. It is still a rather hard-hitting document which retains the substance you liked in the February 18th draft. If you have time you might want to read the first nine pages again to assure yourself on this point. (You may want to check the paragraph added on page 6 to meet a Joint Staff concern.)

(U) A few of the additions and issues should be brought to your attention here (at TAB C is the earlier memorandum on this subject I sent you last week which includes a longer list):

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(U) Six Pillars. To help identify our restructured programming priorities, we have shifted from the traditional four pillars of military capability to six pillars of defense resources. At Don Yockey's request we have retitled the two new pillars formed out of the traditional modernization pillar: "Science and Technology" replaces "Research and Development" and "System Acquisition" replaces "Procurement." (p.30)
-- (U) **Total Force Policy.** The previous draft talked about maintaining military personnel in that component "in which they can effectively accomplish required missions quickly, with minimum casualties, and at the least cost." In partial response to a comment from Steve Duncan and after discussion with General Powell, we have changed the text to read, "in which they can most effectively (including with minimum casualties) and most economically accomplish required missions." (p.32)

-- (U) **SDI.** The guidance on SDI directs programming including a number of specific dates. To meet this schedule requires concurrent development which is an exception to the new acquisition approach. We are still working to craft some language recognizing the need for prudent management and discriminating choices if these dates are to be achieved. (p.33)

-- (S/N) **Army Corps in Europe.** At the Army's request and after discussion with the Chairman, we have changed language on a heavy corps in Europe from "retain" to "commit." This provides the Army some flexibility for programming below in Europe after FY 1995. (p.34)

-- (S/N) **SWA Prepositioning.** As you will remember from the Mobility Requirements Study, I believe it is important to preserve the option to preposition an additional two heavy brigade sets to counter threats in SWA. The Army's comments indicated a preference for prepositioning on land vice afloat and suggested

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FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(5)

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I'm biased, but I think this is an impressive document that faithfully reflects the direction you have set for the Department. Scooter and his staffs deserve to be congratulated.

Prepared by: David M. Shilling, x46535

SECRET/NOPFORN
SUBJECT: Department of the Army Comments on the 16 April 1992 Draft FY 94-95 Defense Planning Guidance

1. (U) The Army has conducted an assessment of the 16 April 92 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and recommends the following general and specific changes to improve the accuracy and clarity of the document. Army cannot concur until the specified critical comments in paragraph 3 below are addressed.

2. (U) GENERAL COMMENTS.

a. (U) Inconsistencies with the National Military Strategy (NMS) and Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). The DPG uses language and sets guidance that differs from that found in the NMS and MRS. Recommend using the lexicon for strategic concepts set in the NMS and the ship procurement guidance established in the MRS.

b. (U) Fully Funding Acquisition Programs. Full funding for acquisition programs should not apply to programs in the demonstration/validation phase. To explore and develop innovative technologies, we must have the latitude to complete the demonstration/validation phase before committing to production. Recommend restricting full funding requirements accordingly.

c. (U) 0% Real Growth. Requirements to maintain 0% real growth are too specific for the DPG. Dollar resource guidance is normally set in the Program Decision Memorandum. Depending on the baseline used and the duration of the goal, the resulting requirement may be unaffordable. Recommend deleting requirements for 0% real growth for Engineering and Manufacturing Development.

3. SPECIFIC COMMENTS.

AR-1 (U) CRITICAL Page 30, para 7. Army. Change as follows:

"Commit to Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with CS capability and a base for reception and onward movement."

Rationale. Presents a more realistic and flexible way of programming to meet NATO commitments.

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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. L006-003, document 7
AR-2 (S/M) CRITICAL Page 31, Para 6. Correct as follows:

"Maintain 3 division headquarters, 6 heavy brigade sets, and one ACR set of combat and support equipment and an M-day shortfall package. Maintain equipment availability to support a possible future decision to preposition additional heavy brigade sets of combat and support equipment in austere prepositioned to counter threats in SWA."

Rationale. Meets CJCS and USD (P) guidance at Enclosure 1. While we see the advantages of prepositioning in SWA, we prefer ashore over afloat prepositioning for a number of reasons. Ashore prepositioning is more cost effective and is more accessible for training, exercising and maintaining. More importantly, it allows us to use fast ships to project the fighting force from CONUS to any theater. See 25 FEB 92 SECARMY response to 22 JAN 92 USD (P) Memo also at Enclosure 1.

AR-3 (U) CRITICAL Page 32, Para 3. Change as follows:

"For sealift, acquire through new construction or conversion in US shipyards additional large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships....will provide the capability to surge 2 heavy divisions from CONUS. Enhance the prepositioned force of the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) to 142 ships through construction or conversion, or build-and-charter vessels with national defense features (including availability for afloat prepositioning) that provide equivalent responsiveness at lower cost. Support...manning. Ship procured to meet the prepositioning and surge requirements must be capable of at least 24 knot sustained speed."

Rationale. Consistent with Mobility Requirements Study (pages IV-32 and IV-33) at Enclosure 2.

AR-4 CRITICAL Page 27, Para 4. Add to the end of the paragraph as follows:

"The strategy also gives high priority to selected R&D to keep our qualitative edge...and distinguished R&D and procurement as separate programming priorities. For an entirely new "experimental" type of system, not currently in the base force, the OSD acquisition full funding policy will not apply until after completion of the Demonstration/Validation phase. This strategy signifies a commitment to thoroughly understand the technology...and the implications of integrating it into the..."
force, before committing to Engineering and Manufacturing Development and a meaningful level of production."

Rationale. Change consistent with discussion of R&O found earlier in pages 38 and 40, requiring the pursuit of future technological advantages with less program risk and committing to procurement only when necessary.

AR-5 (U) CRITICAL Page 40, Para 4. First Sentence. Change to read:

"Fund all acquisition programs continued or initiated in the POMs, in accordance with the Milestone II. Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD), baseline approved by the DAB."

Rationale. This clarification is critical and is consistent with AR-4. Services should not be required to meet full funding requirements at Milestone I, Demonstration/Evaluation Phase before the technology has been evaluated. If the technology proves itself and is selected for further development and transition to production (Milestone II, EMD), full funding rules would then apply.


"Manufacturing Technology. Fund the Manufacturing Technology programs at not less than zero percent real growth per year, as projected from the FY 1992 funding level. ManTech technical priorities will be based upon thrust areas identified in the National Defense Manufacturing Technology Plan."

Rationale. The Army cannot concur with the guidance provided in the paragraph entitled Manufacturing Technology. The Army has already accepted the 0% real growth requirements for the science and technology base. Further 0% real growth requirements for manufacturing technology programs place additional restrictions on the already diminished Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA) funds. Some manufacturing technology programs are already part of the science and technology base that has been protected at 0% growth level, although these programs should compete for the overall science and technology base funding. BOTTOM LINE: 0% real growth in manufacturing technology makes the program unaffordable because the Army currently has no billpayers to fund it. If required to resource 0% growth, the Army will be forced to divert funds from the already underfunded RDA program.
"Installations not required to support the reduced-force levels or to support reconstitution will be closed in accordance with Title XXIX of PL 101-510. Accordingly, plan to resource facility investment at those remaining installations which have a high probability of retention only at those core installations which have a very high probability of retention, as documented in the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment process. Confine facility investment at non-core installations to that required to address life/safety and environmental conditions."

Fund environmental stewardship to attain and sustain full compliance with federal and state environmental laws and governing standards overseas; and to minimize negative mission impacts and future costs to provide federal leadership in environmental protection, compliance, provide federal leadership in environmental protection."

Rationale. The term "core installations" connotes preselection which is a violation of Public Law and factoring reconstitution into BRAC is appropriate given it is one of the four foundations of the NMS. Comments on environmental stewardship vice compliance with federal and state regulation is better guidance for DoD's environmental policies.

"Program for 12 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre divisions...and sufficient support forces...for two concurrent major regional contingencies that develop sequentially."  

Rationale. Is the preferred means of meeting valid, but otherwise unsatisfied support requirements.

"For support and training assets for these forces, plan to draw to the maximum extent possible from the civil sector, the defense production base, Wartime Host Nation Support, contingency contracting..."

Rationale. WHNS and contingency contracting are primary resources to support the force and should be included.
"The short notice that may characterize many regional crises requires highly responsive military forces. Active Component forces have a critical role to play in supplying combat and support forces for the initial response to contingencies that arise on short notice. Reserve Component forces will, among other roles, contribute mobility assets in short notice crises, support and sustain active combat forces and provide combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve Component combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the U.S. capability to respond to another contingency.

Rationale. Clarity. The second to last sentence in this paragraph is clear and true. The last sentence is potentially confusing and does not add to the discussion of the Total Force response to crisis.

"Deployable Anti-Armor: air-deployable ground force mobility and anti-armor capabilities for enhanced immediate tactical flexibility. (e.g., motorized-light armor with long-range anti-tank weaponry)"

Rationale. Accuracy. Example provides unnecessary detail that may be viewed as advocacy for a specific weapons system to satisfy the deployable anti-armor requirement.
LIST OF ACTIONS REQUESTED DURING PW DPG REVIEW

IMMEDIATE

Sensitive/Close Hold memo to SecDef on layaway (being revised)

PW talk to Powell about to be displayed in the Army POM (done); IPS preface

List of issues for the Secretary including SWA prepo; summary of sustainability guidance indicating the significance of the change from the past

SL/PW raise with SecDef issues

Memo from General Council stating milcon language is legal

Atwood issues: Milstar (but delete); sustainability; review Atwood decision on deleting SOF force structure

SL to talk to all Service Secretaries to review disposition of their major comments; including assuring they know T&E floor is being restored to the document as Acquisition requested; Rice about placement of B-2

SL to talk to Duncan about

SL to talk to Fraser to assure he is happy with the deal negotiated with Christie on pillars and S&T language overall; and to assure they really want T&E floor language restored

Paragraph summaries of scenarios for possible consideration as an alternative to the "short scenarios"

MEDIUM TERM

S&R look at Perth for homeporting

R&P respond to SL's questions about the difference between the ships in the RRF with

S&R to do a scrub of

Starting Tuesday morning, prepare unclassified document
KEY ISSUES FOR THE ARMY

- We have changed language on a heavy corps as you requested (page 38)

- We have not changed the text as you requested to require full funding only in Milestone II and thereafter (page 27 and 40)

The requirement for full funding from the outset of the Demonstration/Validation phase (Milestone I) was stated by the Deputy Secretary last July and recently affirmed by the USDA

We have retained language requiring (page 31)

I am flagging this issue for the Secretary -- but it is something, as you know, that USDP feels strongly about

We have revised the language to demonstrate your preference for land as opposed to afloat prepositioning, should suitable sites be available

- We have restored the floor on T&E funding that was in the Feb 18 draft as requested by Acquisition

The guidance directs the Services to fund T&E facilities investment at no less than zero percent real growth with a goal of two percent real growth. (page 50)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: M. P. W. Stone, Secretary of the Army

THROUGH: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: FY 94-99 Defense Planning Guidance--Army Comments

PURPOSE: INFORMATION--To forward the Army's nonconcurrence with the draft FY94-99 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) dated 16 APR 1992.

DISCUSSION: The Army's nonconcurrence is based on inconsistencies between the DPG and the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, as well as the Mobility Requirements Study, and significant planning and programming considerations. The attached comments summarize primary Army concerns. These comments were also identified during the review of the initial draft DPG staffed with in the Services in February 1992.

Specific areas of concern include: the requirement to "retain" vice "commit" a heavy corps in Europe; zero percent real growth requirements in Research, Development and Acquisition beyond those already in place; fails to address adequately resource facility investment and environmental stewardship.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Secretary of Defense consider the attached comments in completing the final FY94-99 DPG.

SECDEF DECISION

Approved

Disapproved

Other:

SECRET-HOFORM

"Regraded Unclassified When Separated from Enclosure"
reductions than now planned would risk destroying the force's high quality. Accordingly, we will program base force levels as follows:

**Nuclear Forces:** B-52 and B-1 bombers; 550 ICBMs; and 18 SSBNs

**Conventional Forces:**
- **Army:** 12 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre divisions
- **Navy:** 12 aircraft carrier battle groups with 11 active and 2 reserve air wings; approximately 450 total ships
- **Marine Corps:** 3 active Marine Expeditionary Forces and one reserve Marine division and wing
- **Air Force:** 15.25 active and 11.25 reserve fighter wings, plus conventional bomber capability including 20 B-2s

(U) These forces can and will be provided with **not greater than** the following military end strengths:

- **Army:** 536,000 active, 567,400 reserve
- **Navy:** 501,200 active, 117,800 reserve
- **Marine Corps:** 159,100 active, 34,900 reserve
- **Air Force:** 430,300 active, 200,000 reserve

(U) Required military personnel will be maintained in that component of the Total Force -- active or reserve -- in which they can effectively accomplish required missions quickly, with minimum casualties, and at the least cost. This generally requires forces for forward presence (including an associated CONUS rotation advisors). Air Force too would delete as unnecessary. Given the debate over defense budget levels, the key point here centers on faster reductions.

1 Joint Staff, Acquisition and ASD/PA&E would cite B-2 here. Air Force no comment. See also note 2 on p. 35

2 PA&E would change to read "3 (-)" MEFs and "one (-)" division/wing. Rationale: "to avoid the impression that the reductions caused no loss in capability". This is a valid point, but USMC and Joint Staff would likely object, and the change would constitute an OSD redefinition of the base force -- to be avoided here. Also, only one of the MEFS is being substantially reduced in strength. PA&E also proposed adding the training carrier to the list -- rejected.

3 PDAS(D/O/LIC) proposes inserting here 7 lines of text detailing SOF levels. Might satisfy them to replace the brief SOF cite of earlier drafts, in the Crisis Response section.

4 ASD/RA would delete "quickly, with intelligent deployment times" for "quickly" but the real point -- the ability to end hostilities quickly -- would be lost (and indeed could be clarified by replacing "accomplish required missions" with "end hostilities").
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LIBBY

SUBJECT: Extracts from 18 Feb 92 DPG Draft

Attached are two sets of extracts from the 18 February 1992 DPG draft that are not reflected in the current working draft or which have changed substantively as the draft has evolved.

Tab A identifies those issues I believe merit reconsideration for inclusion in the final draft. After each extract, I suggest why it may provide additional clarity or introduce a sufficiently worthwhile concept so as to warrant reconsideration.

Tab B lists those extracts that I believe were properly deleted or reworked sufficiently to provide a more accurate statement of intended policy. I suggest you quickly review these extracts, but would add that little more need be done with them.

The items I propose for reconsideration are summarized below:

• the criterion for defining critical regions.
• forward basing, its importance and changing nature.
• linkages between crisis response strategy, required forces and programming.
• intelligence requirements to identify possible reconstitution threat.
• reference to low-intensity conflict.
• regionally focused arms control.
• preservation of NATO's integrated command structure.

Consideration of these items, along with our other comments to the current working draft would, in my view, provide for a more comprehensive document. I am available to discuss these matters or provide specific editorial recommendations if you like.

Dale A. Vesser
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Resources and Plans)

Prepared by: Andrew Hoehn, x18478

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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
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Extracts from 18 February 1992
Draft Defense Planning Guidance
Meriting Further Consideration

• p.2, "...prevent any hostile power from dominating a region
whose resources [and population] could, under consolidated
control, generate global power." I think it is important to
define what we mean by critical region, lest we provide others the
opportunity to define the term for us. Of the several definitions
I have seen, this is as thorough and concise as any.

• p.11, "Forward basing, of necessity, must become more flexible
to accommodate changing regional configurations and to allow for a
more dynamic character in our alliance relationships [and crisis
response capabilities]. This is true for our withdrawal from the
Philippines, but it will be true elsewhere as well, including
Panama. Basing and access arrangements will evolve as our regional
commitments evolve, but must remain oriented on providing visible,
though unobtrusive, presence and a forward staging area for
responding to [and supporting] crises, large and small." The 25
March draft leans more in the direction of covering forward bases,
but I think the subject merits separate coverage along these
lines. As much as anything, it is our forward basing structure
that allows us to maintain global interests at acceptable cost.
Maintaining an adequate forward base structure is critical to
executing our strategy.

• p.31, "The most demanding aspect of the new strategy is the need
to maintain the capability to respond decisively to a major
regional contingency. This serves as the foundation for
structuring and evaluating the bulk of the defense program, but it
places particular emphasis on several areas: high readiness to
enable rapid response to short warning regional contingencies;
sufficient munitions and spares to sustain a major regional
conflict; enhanced mobility to enable us to deploy sizable forces
a long distance on short notice; and a number of specific force
enhancements growing out of lessons learned from Desert Storm."
The crisis response section would benefit from a concluding
summary paragraph along these lines that draws specific links
between strategy, force, and resource requirements. Our case is
significantly strengthened by these types of linkages.
p. 7, "Arms control, once the centerpiece of US-Soviet Cold War relations, will take on new forms in this post-Cold War era. There are likely to be more regionally focused initiatives to grapple with the enforcement of obligations under such agreements as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Innovation in approach and stricter enforcement of requirements will be the hallmark features of the international dialogue in this area, growing out of a perception that the international community has a major stake in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems." The reference to arms control was recently deleted from the introduction to the regional section. I would urge that it be reincorporated.

p. 18, "While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the Alliance's integrated command structure." A reference to maintaining NATO's integrated command structure is necessary even in a brief discussion of our policy objectives in Europe.
Defense Strategy Objectives

- p.2, There are three additional aspects to this [first objective] objective: First, the US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that can convince potential competitors not to pursue a more aggressive posture to secure their legitimate interests. Second, in non-defense areas, we must sufficiently respect the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain mechanisms, in concert with our allies, to deter potential aggressors from aspiring to a larger regional or global role.

- p.2, The second objective is to address sources of regional conflict and instability in ways that promote increasing respect for international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic government and open economic systems.

Warning

- pp.5-6, Ambiguities over warning in the new strategic environment pose a difficult, dual-faceted problem. At one extreme, many regional and local conflicts with potential to challenge US interests will develop with little or no notice, or the circumstances preceding conflict will be sufficiently ambiguous as to limit preparations or effectively prevent initiation of deterrent measures which might forestall aggression. At the other extreme, a resurgent global threat or general remilitarization of the international environment would take several years to materialize and likely would be accompanied, at first, by very subtle indicators. The challenge of warning, therefore, is to be poised to detect regional and local threats that could develop on very short notice while at the same time remaining alert to the potential for a resurgent global threat or general remilitarization --and to define mechanisms that would alert timely responses for either case.
maintaining a range of options that provide, should deterrence fail, the hope of terminating conflict at the lowest level of violence.

Forward Presence

• p.12, ...pressures to reduce our forces and access to bases [in the East Asia/Pacific region] will constrain our presence options.

• pp.12-13, In other regions, as the need for our military presence continues or as we see that some new or additional form of presence might further stability, we will increasingly rely on periodic visits of air, ground, and naval forces, training missions, access agreements, prepositioned equipment, exercises, combined planning, and security and humanitarian assistance. These more subtle but no less important forward presence operations most tangibly reflect the evolving commitment of US military forces that we can expect in a dynamic global environment. This implies a more fluid role for our presence forces rather than an appreciable increase to the overall level of activity. Indeed, absent a global challenge, we might broadly anticipate a general decline in the overall level of activity recognizing a more selective use of military forces in overseas missions.

Crisis Response

• p.13, Certainty that in a crisis US forward deployed forces will be reinforced quickly and carry the ultimate threat of theater and strategic nuclear weapons is an inescapable element of any would-be aggressor's strategic calculus.

• p.14, Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including effective forcible entry capabilities, remain key elements of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges. We must be ready to deploy a broad array of capabilities, including heavy and light ground forces, tactical aviation forces, naval and amphibious forces, and special operations forces.

• p.14, ...our forces must remain able to respond rapidly to a second major regional crisis or to expand an initial crisis deployment in the event of escalation, also on short notice. This too has major implications for the mix and readiness of our forces, as well as potential apportionment of forces by theater. Preparing for operations in differing combat theaters places special training demands on the operating forces and necessitates maintaining a wide array of combat and support capabilities. In the event of concurrent contingencies, major or minor, force allocations and priorities will be determined by the National Command Authority....

• p.15, If quick victory is not possible or the protracted nature of a conflict threatens to exhaust our forces our our national
will, an opponent must remain convinced that US strategic assets may be employed leaving no possibility of victory at acceptable risk.

- p.15, crisis response capabilities depend on our ability to secure the global posture necessary for timely regional action. This demands that all forward presence forces be structured in a way to support major regional crises, even outside their traditional theaters of operation.

- p.5, The actual use of weapons of mass destruction, even in conflicts that otherwise do not directly engage U.S. interests, could spur further proliferation which in turn would threaten world order. Thus, the US may be faced with the question of whether to take military steps to prevent the development or use of weapons of mass destruction. Possible steps could include threatening punishment for use of such weapons through a variety of means, preempting an impending nuclear/biological/chemical attack through conventional means, or punishing the attackers if deterrence failed. Preemption or punishment could involve the destruction of nuclear, biological or chemical warfare facilities. The requirements for preemption would be very demanding including adequate intelligence, targeting data, and appropriate weapons and delivery systems.

Reconstitution

- p.15, Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.

- p.25, In the very near term, the former Soviets' large treaty-limited equipment stocks, military industrial base and recently demobilized forces could provide some residual capability for rebuilding their forces if they so decided.

- p.26, Region-wide domination of Europe, East Asia, the former Soviet Union, or Southwest Asia would give such an aggressor a strategic base from which to pursue global expansionist aims. The military capability to pursue such aims would require a combination of modern defense industrial and technological capacity, and a sizeable population base.

- p.26, planned reconstitution forces should not "mirror image," in size or type, those of an aggressor. For example, the aggressor would face the more demanding requirements for an offensive strategy, while our strategic requirements would be to maintain adequate force ratios for a defensive strategy.

- p.27, consistent with NATO alliance policy, we will retain nuclear capabilities as an option of truly last resort, which is perhaps particularly relevant for deterrence or defense against a reconstitution-type threat.
Force reconstitution includes activities analogous to the three "phases" of graduated mobilization response activity (peacetime planning and preparations, measured responses to a crisis, and large scale force expansion). However, reconstitution strategy subsumes and expands upon such established concepts and capabilities as full and total mobilization and graduated mobilization response. The potential of reconstituting new types of forces is one such difference. We should investigate innovative reconstitution measures that may become increasingly useful in the future, such as new types of more producible but militarily useful equipment (and accompanying doctrines), and abilities to rapidly move next-generation systems into production.

Regional Goals and Challenges--Introduction

The demise of the Soviet Union has resulted in increasingly desperate conditions for the remaining true-believer Marxist regimes, which no longer enjoy the lavish Soviet economic assistance to which they were accustomed and, more importantly, are no longer able to count on Soviet support in a crisis.

Both Cuba and North Korea seem to be entering periods of intense crisis--primarily economic, but also political--which may lead their governments to take actions that would otherwise seem irrational. The same potential exists in China.

An additional source of instability may derive from the break-up of multinational states that have lost their ideological or other raisons d'être.

...new conflicts may arise from population and environmental pressures.

Europe

...for the foreseeable future the continued fragmentation of the former Soviet state and its conventional armed forces have altered so fundamentally the character of the residual threat as to eliminate the capacity of the Commonwealth or its member states to wage global conventional war. An attack against Western Europe appears beyond the Commonwealth's capabilities without a time consuming reversal and several years of reconstitution. Even to threaten East/Central Europe with a limited objective attack would provide at least several months of warning.

Increasingly Russia is acquiring the attributes of the center, including the former USSR's Security Council seat in the United Nations and responsibility for Soviet forces still stationed outside the territory of the former Soviet Union. Yet, to date, the CIS has shown itself to be remarkably adaptable.

...democratic change in Russia is not irreversible, and that despite its current travails, Russia will remain the
strongest military power in Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States.

* pp.17-18, We should encourage Moscow to undertake significant unilateral conventional force reductions beyond those already negotiated in CFE. We should ensure that future negotiations or unilateral Western reductions do not create disparities unfavorable to the West. In any future negotiations with Moscow, we should ensure that an adequate NATO theater nuclear capability in Europe is not jeopardized. We should ensure that any agreement on further conventional force reductions does not preclude US reinforcement of Europe or the US ability to respond to regional crises using assets in Europe.

With regard to the residual Soviet/Russian presence and possible ambitions outside of the territory of the former Soviet Union, our goals are ensuring the completion of Soviet/Russian troop withdrawals from Germany and Poland, integrating the independent Baltic states and those former Soviet republics that become peaceful democracies with markets and respect for individual rights into overall European economic and security institutions, and preventing Russia, should it seek to do so, from reestablishing a hegemonic position in Eastern Europe.

Outside Europe, the former Soviet threat in Southwest and Southeast Asia has been significantly reduced by the Soviet/Russian withdrawals from these areas and the impending end of military and economic assistance to former clients. The announced withdrawal of Soviet military elements from Cuba is another important step in Moscow's retreat from its former overseas empire. We should continue to press Moscow to disengage completely from the remaining Communist regimes.

* p.18, ...our support for European integration should be conditioned on the premise that, as democratic consolidation continues in Europe, Western European institutions should be broadened to include all democratic European nations. We should resist moves toward the residual integration among the current members of European institutions in ways that exclude the admittance of appropriate new participants.

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FOIA §5 USC §552(b)(5)

* p.19, The new threat environment in Europe will require a more flexible US force posture, with greater reliance on air and naval forces and force projection capabilities, particularly strategic lift.
• p.20, East/Central European membership in the EC at the earliest opportunity, and expanded NATO liaison are key to this process.

• p.20, The US could also consider extending to the East/Central European states security commitments analogous to those we have extended to Gulf states. These commitments could be extended after consultations with our NATO allies and preferably in cooperation with other NATO states. Such commitments would bring the East/Central European states into the Western security network and help to stabilize the region. The provision of a defense guarantee to East/Central European states would have important implications for the US force structure in Europe.

• p.20, Should there be a reemergence of a threat from the Soviet Union's successor state, we should plan to defend against such a threat in Eastern Europe, should there be an Alliance decision to do so.

East Asia/Pacific

• p.21, Our foremost security requirement is to be able to defend effectively Hawaii, Alaska, US territories and the Freely Associated States (Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands).

• p.21, [Maintaining preeminent military status in the region] will enable the US to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon.

• p.21, We must pay particular attention to the former [-----------------]

• p.22, We need better intelligence yielding improved strategic warning to permit us to benefit from greater economy of force.

Middle East/Southwest Asia

• p.22, In the Middle East and Southwest Asia (SWA), our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western access to the region's oil.

• p.22, ...it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula.

• p.23, We must focus these [security assistance] programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning [-----------------]
Latin America

*p.23, A substantially increased US military presence, especially naval and amphibious forces, more combined exercises to improve interoperability and command and control, increased US arms sales, and security assistance coordinated through a forward USCENTCOM command element will help deter potential threats to our friends.

*p.24, ...our programs must provide capabilities to meet a variety of potential Cuban contingencies which could include an attempted repetition of the Mariel boatlift, a military provocation, although with limited capabilities, against the US or an American ally, or political instability and internal conflict in Cuba.

*p.24, ...we need to help stabilize and bolster the counter-insurgency capabilities of the government of [-----] which is facing a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency.
New Policy Directions
Noted in Draft Defense Planning Guidance

Policy and Strategy Section

- Preclude hostile, nondemocratic domination of regions [Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf] critical to our interests, and thereby strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat (pp. 3 and 12; see also pp. 19, 31, and 39).

- Lead to a security community that extends to all peace-loving nations, including the new democracies of Eastern Europe and a democratic Russia, Ukraine, and other democracies of the former Soviet Union (p. 3; see also pp. 7, 32 and 33).

- It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance (p. 8).

- The demise of the Soviet Union and the increasing strength of our allies permit us to define our regional interests selectively and to safeguard those interests in separate regional contexts and at lower resource levels (p. 11).

- A future President will need to have options that will allow him to lead or, where prudent and practical, to act to protect our critical interests even in cases where very few others are with us. We must plan sufficient forces and programs within current fiscal constraints to provide such options.... (p. 12).

- A critical task will be to begin preparing for tomorrow's [core] competencies, while gaining an appreciation of those we need no longer emphasize (p. 17).

- U.S. forces must continue to be at least a generation ahead in those technologies which will be decisive on future battlefields. Future generations must have at least the same qualitative advantages over their opponents as our forces did in the Gulf War (p. 18).

- We need to be able to fight future forces through simulation...

- Our strategic nuclear forces...provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat (p. 20).
We must...examine more innovative ways of providing strategic deterrent forces...We might also find ways of ensuring that some of our additional forces...by going to lower alert levels for some portions of the force...(p.21).

Further, we should find methods of being more effective in projecting forces in peacetime...We might also consider increased use of Reserve Component units overseas...additional homeporting...(p.24).

Our forces must remain able to respond rapidly to a second major regional crisis or to expand an initial crisis deployment in the event of escalation...(p.27). (First time specific guidance on second major regional contingency to be given in unclassified context.)

...Mobility, forces must be capable of accomplishing a major force deployment within current planning parameters...(p.29).

...Reconstitution now focuses on a 7-9 year warning time, and drops the exclusive focus on but still notes the valuable "hedging" opportunities now available...(p.30).

...Our challenge is to maintain our collective capacity to defend against an aggressive regime in such a way that we do not disrupt future cooperation with a democratic state or weaken the chances of successful reform...(p.33).

...Our policy should encourage the broadening of European institutions to include the democracies of Eastern Europe...(p.35).
We should encourage the states to play a positive role in stability and democratic consolidation.

While continuing the opening should also have the means to defend itself. In this sense, the U.S. should enforce and provide with modernized armaments to be used in its defense (p.37).

Programming Section

- Strategic forces guidance requires and addendum to the Service POMs detailing the changes that would be required accepts PNI II proposals (p.2).

- Forward presence guidance adjusts the levels approved last summer to retain more robust CentCom presence, and requires a of naval presence requirements (pp.4-5; and p.3)

- Prepositioning guidance requires Army to retain another brigades of equipment for possible future prepositioning, as recommended by

- Sustainability guidance requires, for each of the two most demanding Major Regional Contingency scenarios, 1) "threat-oriented" munitions to kill and 2) "level of effort" sustainment for operations (p.10).

- Reconstitution guidance sets force levels of reconstitution capability for the Services to provide at low cost through equipment stockpiles or production capability (pp.22-23).
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LIBBY

SUBJECT: Abbreviated Scenarios for Inclusion in DPG—Issues? (U)

(U) Attached for your review are the abbreviated scenarios in close-to-final form (TAB A). General Powell has begun to review the Joint Staff's detailed versions for his personal final judgements; we may receive them formally as soon as early next week. You and/or Mr. Wolfowitz may still have one or two major issues (as I have advised the Joint Staff); MRC-Europe particularly needs resolution.
ILLUSTRATIVE PLANNING SCENARIOS

PREFACE

This set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94-99 Defense Program appropriate to the changing security environment and new strategy. Most broadly, this scenario set tangibly reflects the shift in focus from a single monolithic global scenario to an array of regional scenarios. The uncertainty of the international security environment makes it difficult to predict and estimate the circumstances under which US military power might be employed. Although changing world events make some individual scenarios decidedly less probable than others, all are useful for planning under the new strategy.

These scenarios are illustrative, not predictive or exhaustive. They depict plausible future events illustrating the types of circumstances in which the application of US military power might be required. Consistent with the new strategy, each scenario involves plausible threats in regions of vital interest to the US, and corresponding achievable military objectives. While these scenarios do not represent the only threats which could emerge in regions vital to US interests, they do illustrate a substantial range of the kinds of capabilities US forces might have to employ in various regions of the world, and are therefore useful for analysis.

This scenario set is to be used as an analytical tool for the formulation and assessment of defense programs. While the Base Force is sized to support the elements of the new strategy, these scenarios enable planners and programmers to examine defense programs for appropriate levels of combat power, mobility, readiness and sustainment. The FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda should reflect requirements derived largely but not solely from this scenario set. Although these scenarios focus largely on Crisis Response and Reconstitution, each of the four elements of our strategy involve other requirements which are not fully addressed in this scenario set and yet require programming actions and analysis. The order in which the scenarios appear does not imply any regional priority for programming purposes.

This scenario set is not intended to constrain planners from adjusting to future changes in the strategic environment. Subsequent to its publication as guidance for formulation and assessment of the FY 94-99 program, continued evolution in the strategic environment, or emerging requirements for scenarios for other applications, may require the development of additional or more detailed scenarios. If necessary, the data presented in this set
should be updated for future applications until superseded by the next DPG scenario set. However, strategic concepts and assumptions presented in this scenario set should generally be retained in any scenarios developed for other applications.

Any detailed analysis of this DPG scenario set should use the information in the more detailed version developed by the Joint Staff and promulgated by official(s) on data, from which these scenarios were derived.
Wholly from public release
Under statutory authority
of the Department of Defense

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)

FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)
Withheld from public release under statutory authority of the Department of Defense
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(5)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)
Withheld from public release under statutory authority of the Department of Defense FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(5)
ANNEX A

ILLUSTRATIVE PLANNING SCENARIOS

PREFACE

(U) The following set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94-99 Defense Program. These scenarios reflect the changing security environment and the new defense strategy. They embody the change in focus from the former Soviet global war scenario to an array of possible regional contingencies.

(U) These scenarios are not predictions of future events. They by no means exhaust the range of possible threats to US interests in the planning period and beyond. They do not imply any strategic or programming priority among regions. Nor do they constitute a commitment or policy decision to respond in any particular way should events such as they depict actually occur.

(U) Rather, the scenarios are illustrations for technical analytical purposes. They depict plausible future events illustrating the types of circumstances in which the application of US military power might be required. Consistent with the new strategy, each scenario involves plausible threats to US interests, and corresponding achievable military objectives. While not exhaustive, they illustrate a substantial range of the kinds of capabilities US forces might have to employ in various regions of the world. Although changing world events make some individual scenarios decidedly less probable than others, all are useful for planning under the new strategy.

(U) The uncertainty of the international security environment (see the "Uncertainty" discussion in the strategy section) makes it difficult -- in some respects, impossible -- to project or estimate the circumstances under which US military power might be employed; the size of US, allied/coalition, and adversary forces that could be involved; and the details of how such operations would be conducted and supported. The detailed characterizations and data in the scenarios address possible future events that are in fact unknown. Rather, their precision is necessary to provide precise guidance for programming, and a common "yardstick" for the various Defense Components to use in formulating and evaluating the defense programs.

(U) These scenarios are to be used as an analytical tool for the formulation and assessment of defense programs. The scenarios are not the basis for sizing overall force
structure or the Base Force -- the overall force is sized to support the elements of the new defense strategy. Rather, these scenarios enable planners and programmers to examine defense programs for appropriate levels of combat power, mobility, readiness and sustainment. The FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda should (within fiscal guidance) reflect requirements derived largely but not solely from this scenario set. Although these scenarios focus primarily on Crisis Response and, in one case, Reconstitution, each of the four elements of our strategy involve other requirements which are not fully addressed in this scenario set and yet require programming actions and analysis -- for example, strategic deterrence, forward presence, and operations in widely varying climates and terrains.

(U) This scenario set is not intended to constrain planners from adjusting to future changes in the strategic environment. Subsequent to its publication as guidance for formulation and assessment of the FY 94-99 program, continued evolution in the strategic environment, or emerging requirements for scenarios for other applications, may require the development of additional or more detailed scenarios. If necessary, the data presented in this set should be updated for future applications until superseded by the next DPG scenario set. However, strategic concepts and assumptions presented in this scenario set should generally be retained in any scenarios developed for other applications.

(U) The U.S. Forces listing in each Major Regional Contingency identifies, in addition to those forces that would be required to conduct fully effective counteroffensive operations (listed as Deploy-to-Fight Forces), extra forces (listed as Overwhelming Forces) whose optional employment would reduce US and allied casualties and achieve victory more quickly and decisively. If the NCA determined that the presence of these forces was required, major counteroffensive operations would be delayed until these forces could be delivered to the conflict.

(U) Any detailed analysis of this DPG scenario set should use the information in the more detailed version from which these scenarios were derived.
ANNEX A

ILLUSTRATIVE PLANNING SCENARIOS (U)

PREFACE (U)

(U) The following set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94-99 Defense Program. These scenarios reflect the changing security environment and the new defense strategy. They embody the change in focus from the former Soviet global war scenario to an array of possible regional contingencies.

(U) These scenarios are not predictions of future events. They by no means exhaust the range of possible threats to US interests in the planning period and beyond. They do not imply any strategic or programming priority among regions. Nor do they constitute a commitment or policy decision to respond in any particular way should events such as they depict actually occur.

(U) Rather, the scenarios are illustrations for technical analytical purposes. They depict plausible future events illustrating the types of circumstances in which the application of US military power might be required. Consistent with the new strategy, each scenario involves plausible threats to US interests, and corresponding achievable military objectives. While not exhaustive, they do illustrate a substantial range of the kinds of capabilities US forces might have to employ in various regions of the world. Although changing world events make some individual scenarios decidedly less probable than others, all are useful for planning under the new strategy.

(U) The uncertainty of the international security environment (see the "Uncertainty" discussion in the strategy section) makes it difficult -- in some respects, impossible -- to project or estimate the circumstances under which US military power might be employed; the size of US, allied/coalition, and adversary forces that could be involved; and the details of how such operations would be conducted and supported. The detailed characterizations and data in the scenarios address possible future events that are in fact unknown. Rather, their precision is necessary to provide precise guidance for programming, and a common "yardstick" for the various Defense Components to use in formulating and evaluating the defense programs.

(U) These scenarios are to be used as an analytical tool for the formulation and assessment of defense programs. The scenarios are not the basis for sizing overall force
structure or the Base Force -- the overall force is sized to support the elements of the new defense strategy. Rather, these scenarios enable planners and programmers to examine defense programs for appropriate levels of combat power, mobility, readiness and sustainment. The FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda should (within fiscal guidance) reflect requirements derived largely but not solely from this scenario set. Although these scenarios focus primarily on Crisis Response and, in one case, Reconstitution, each of the four elements of our strategy involve other requirements which are not fully addressed in this scenario set and yet require programming actions and analysis -- for example, strategic deterrence, forward presence, and operations in widely varying climates and terrains.

(U) This scenario set is not intended to constrain planners from adjusting to future changes in the strategic environment. Subsequent to its publication as guidance for formulation and assessment of the FY 94-99 program, continued evolution in the strategic environment, or emerging requirements for scenarios for other applications, may require the development of additional or more detailed scenarios. If necessary, the data presented in this set should be updated for future applications until superseded by the next DPG scenario set. However, strategic concepts and assumptions presented in this scenario set should generally be retained in any scenarios developed for other applications.

(U) The U.S. Forces listing in each Major Regional Contingency identifies, in addition to those forces that would be required to conduct fully effective counteroffensive operations (listed as Deploy-co-Fight Forces), extra forces (listed as Overwhelming Forces) whose optional employment would reduce US and allied casualties and achieve victory more quickly and decisively. If the NCA determined that the presence of these forces was required, major counteroffensive operations would be delayed until these forces could be delivered to the conflict.

(U) Any detailed analysis of this DPG scenario set should use the information in the more detailed version from which these scenarios were derived.
The following set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94-99 Defense Program.

These scenarios reflect the dramatically changing security environment, and our new defense strategy. The move to use of multiple scenarios is a major innovation in defense planning for a new strategic era. It supports the more flexible approach we must take to the more uncertain environment we face, and it tangibly embodies our change in focus from the former Soviet global war scenario to an array of possible regional contingencies. For years we have generally assumed that regional contingencies required only "lesser-included capabilities" -- subsets of the requirements of the one massive scenario that was our focus. Now, absent the margin of safety that was provided by those larger forces, we need more nuanced examination of the broad range of possible regional requirements. These scenarios provide one basis for such examination.

These scenarios are illustrations to be used for technical analytical purposes only. The scenarios:

- are not predictions of future events;
- by no means exhaust the range of possible threats to US interests in the planning period and beyond;
- do not constitute a commitment or policy decision to respond in any particular way should events such as they depict actually occur;
- do not imply any strategic or programming priority among regions; and
- are not the basis for sizing the overall Base Force structure.

While not exhaustive, the scenario set does illustrate a substantial range of the kinds of capabilities US forces might have to employ in various regions of the world. Although changing world events make some individual scenarios distinctly less probable than others, all are useful for planning under the new strategy.
(U) The uncertainty of the international environment (see the "Planning for Uncertainty" discussion in Section II.B.) makes it difficult -- in some respects, impossible -- to project or estimate either the circumstances under which US military power might be employed; or the size of US, allied/coalition, and adversary forces that could be involved; or the details of how such operations might be conducted and supported. The characterizations and data in these scenarios depict events in decidedly greater detail than can in fact be known. Rather, the scenarios include such detail simply to provide precise guidance for programming, and a common "yardstick" for the various Defense Components to use in formulating and evaluating the defense programs.

(U) Accordingly, these scenarios are to be used as an analytical tool where necessary for the formulation and assessment of specific defense requirements and programs. In particular, these scenarios enable planners and programmers to devise and examine defense programs for appropriate levels of mobility, readiness, sustainment, and modernization, and other elements of the capability to employ decisive combat power. They thereby help ensure balance and consistency among types of forces, and across various Components' supporting programs.

(U) (Detailed analysis based on this DPG scenario set -- for example, formulation and evaluation of specific requirements where necessary -- should draw as appropriate on the information in the more detailed version of the scenario set issued by , from which these scenarios were derived.)

(U) However, although these scenarios focus primarily on Crisis Response (and in one case, Reconstitution), each of the four elements of our strategy involve other requirements that are not fully addressed in this scenario set and yet also require programming actions and analysis -- for example, strategic deterrent forces; forward presence, including such activities as humanitarian assistance and combatting drug trafficking; and other crisis response requirements such as operations in widely varying climates, terrains and environments.

(U) Accordingly, the scenarios are not the basis for sizing overall force structure or the Base Force -- the overall force is sized to support all the elements of the new defense strategy. Given the need, explained above, for a more nuanced examination of the full range of possible regional requirements facing a force now sized with less "margin of error" for regional crises, the Department's analyses should evaluate the level of risk inherent in carrying out the new strategy with that force in various regional contexts. Scenarios are a useful tool to assist such evaluation by illuminating capabilities and identifying possible

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deficiencies, and by complementing — as well as tangibly incorporating — experienced professional judgment. But for this purpose, maximum flexibility is desirable; force capabilities should be evaluated using the widest possible range of assumptions, although we must understand at minimum how the force performs with respect to the main areas of capability required, as depicted in this scenario set.

(U) This scenario set is not intended to constrain planners from adjusting to future changes in the strategic environment or evaluating as is needed the adequacy of forces to meet other possible threats. After this set is published and used as guidance for formulating and assessing the FY 94-99 program continued evolution in the strategic environment, or the need for scenarios for other applications, may require the development of additional or more detailed scenarios. If necessary, the information presented in this set should be updated or revised for future applications until superseded by the next PPBS scenario set. However, the fundamental strategic concepts and assumptions underlying this scenario set — as described in the new defense strategy and policies set forth above — should remain the basis for any scenarios developed for other applications.

(U) The list of U.S. Forces in each Major Regional Contingency (MRC) identifies a basic force package that would be able to prevent the enemy from achieving his objectives to stabilize the situation; and to conduct the counteroffensive operation and/or enable the arrival of additional units. Such an additional force package that the NCA might order to the operation is also shown. These forces' employment would make the counteroffensive phase shorter and more decisive with fewer casualties, although their delivery to the conflict would entail a delay in starting the counteroffensive (greater than the reduction in the counteroffensive's duration), during which forces in theater would continue to be subject to combat operations. For the program planning purposes of these scenarios, [do/do not] include the additional force in each scenario's programmatic requirement.

(U) The list of U.S. Forces in each MRC includes only above-the-line (macro-level) combat forces, while the listings for Lesser Regional Contingencies provide somewhat more detailed information on U.S. forces. Planners and programmers should make appropriate assumptions regarding combat support and combat service support force, and below-the-line combat force, in their evaluations for capability requirements.

(U) Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC) scenarios are provided to evaluate U.S. military requirements in circumstances that demand a more rapid delivery of the complete (but much smaller) U.S. force package into theater than do MRCs. Additionally, LRCs place greater emphasis on capabilities for
some types of operations that would be of less relative
importance in MRCs -- for example, non-combatant evacuation,
hostage rescue, and counter-insurgency operations.

(U) A Concurrent Contingencies scenario is provided to
reflect the strategy's recognition that when the U.S. is
engaged, perhaps in concert with others, in responding to a
substantial threat, potential aggressors in other areas may
be tempted to capitalize on our preoccupation -- and that for
both deterrence and defense, we must not leave undue
vulnerability. This scenario illuminates the strategic
choices and tradeoffs inherent in providing adequate response
capability in the event of concurrent contingencies.

(U) A Reconstitution scenario is provided to assist in
planning for capabilities to build additional new forces to
help preclude or respond to any future hostile adversary who
might threaten U.S./allied interests on a global scale. The
overarching aims for reconstitution strategy, and objectives
for reconstitution programming, are set forth in DPG Sections
II.D. and IV.B.
(U) The following set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94-99 Defense Program.

(U) These scenarios reflect the dramatically changing security environment, and our new defense strategy. The move to use of multiple scenarios is a major innovation in defense planning for a new strategic era. It supports the more flexible approach we must take to the more uncertain environment we face, and it tangibly embodies our change in focus from the former Soviet global war scenario to an array of possible regional contingencies. For years we have generally assumed that regional contingencies required only "lesser-included capabilities" -- subsets of the requirements of the one massive scenario that was our focus. Now, absent the margin of safety that was provided by those larger forces, we need more nuanced examination of the broad range of possible regional requirements. These scenarios provide one basis for such examination.

(U) These scenarios are illustrations to be used for technical analytical purposes only. The scenarios:

- are not predictions of future events;
- by no means exhaust the range of possible threats to US interests in the planning period and beyond;
- do not constitute a commitment or policy decision to respond in any particular way should events such as they depict actually occur;
- do not imply any strategic or programming priority among regions; and
- are not the basis for sizing the overall Base Force structure.

While not exhaustive, the scenario set does illustrate a substantial range of the kinds of capabilities US forces might have to employ in various regions of the world. Although changing world events make some individual scenarios distinctly less probable than others, all are useful for planning under the new strategy.
The uncertainty of the international environment makes it difficult -- in some respects, impossible -- to project or estimate either the circumstances under which US military power might be employed; or the size of US, allied/coalition, and adversary forces that could be involved; or the details of how such operations might be conducted and supported. The characterizations and data in these scenarios depict events in decidedly greater detail than can in fact be known. Rather, the scenarios include such detail simply to provide precise guidance for programming, and a common "yardstick" for the various Defense Components to use in formulating and evaluating the defense programs.

Accordingly, these scenarios are to be used as an analytical tool where necessary for the formulation and assessment of specific defense requirements and programs. In particular, these scenarios enable planners and programmers to devise and examine defense programs for appropriate levels of mobility, readiness, sustainment, and modernization, and other elements of the capability to employ decisive combat power. They thereby help ensure balance and consistency among types of forces, and across various Components' supporting programs.

(Detailed analysis based on this DPG scenario set -- for example, formulation and evaluation of specific requirements, where necessary -- should draw as appropriate on the information in the more detailed version of the scenario set issued by ________, from which these scenarios were derived.)

However, although these scenarios focus primarily on Crisis Response (and in one case, Reconstitution), each of the four elements of our strategy involves other requirements that are not fully addressed in this scenario set and yet also require programming actions and analysis -- for example, strategic deterrent forces; forward presence, including such activities as humanitarian assistance and combating drug trafficking; and other crisis response requirements such as operations in widely varying climates, terrains and environments.

Accordingly, the scenarios are not the basis for sizing overall force structure or the Base Force -- the overall force is sized to support all the elements of the new defense strategy. Given the need, explained above, for a more nuanced examination of the full range of possible regional requirements facing a force now sized with less "margin of error" for regional crises, the Department's analyses should evaluate the level of risk inherent in carrying out the new strategy with that force in various regional contexts. Scenarios are a useful tool to assist such evaluation by illuminating capabilities and identifying possible
deficiencies, and by complementing -- as well as tangibly incorporating -- experienced professional judgment. But for this purpose, maximum flexibility is desirable; force capabilities should be evaluated using the widest possible range of assumptions, although we must understand at minimum how the force performs with respect to the main areas of capability required, as depicted in this scenario set.

(U) This scenario set is not intended to constrain planners from adjusting to future changes in the strategic environment or evaluating as is needed the adequacy of forces to meet other possible threats. After this set is published and used as guidance for formulating and assessing the FY 94-99 program, continued evolution in the strategic environment, or the need for scenarios for other applications, may require the development of additional or more detailed scenarios. If necessary, the information presented in this set should be updated or revised for future applications. The fundamental strategic concepts and assumptions underlying this scenario set -- as described in the net defense strategy and policies set forth above -- should remain the basis for any scenarios developed for other applications.

(U) The list of U.S. Forces in each Major Regional Contingency (MRC) identifies a basic force package that would be able to prevent the enemy from achieving his objectives; to stabilize the situation; and to conduct the counteroffensive operation and/or enable the arrival of additional units. Such an additional force package that the NCA might order to the operation is also shown. These forces' employment would make the counteroffensive phase shorter and more decisive with fewer casualties, although their delivery to the conflict would entail a delay in starting that counteroffensive (greater than the reduction in the counteroffensive's duration), during which forces in theater would continue to be subject to combat operations. For the program planning purposes of these scenarios, [do/do not] include the additional forces in each scenario's programmatic requirement.

(U) The list of U.S. Forces in each MRC includes only above-the-line (macro-level) combat forces, while the listings for Lesser Regional Contingencies provide somewhat more detailed information on U.S. forces. Planners and programmers should make appropriate assumptions regarding combat support and combat service support force, and below-the-line combat force, in their evaluations for capability requirements.

(U) Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC) scenarios are provided to evaluate U.S. military requirements in circumstances that demand a more rapid delivery of the complete (but much smaller) U.S. force package into theater than do MRCs. Additionally, LRCs place greater emphasis on capabilities for
some types of operations that would be of less relative importance in MRCs -- for example, non-combatant evacuation, hostage rescue, and counter-insurgency operations.

(U) A Concurrent Contingencies scenario is provided to reflect the strategy's recognition that when the U.S. is engaged, perhaps in concert with others, in responding to a substantial threat, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to capitalize on our preoccupation -- and that for both deterrence and defense, we must not leave undue vulnerability. This scenario illuminates the strategic choices and tradeoffs inherent in providing adequate response capability in the event of concurrent contingencies.

(U) A Reconstitution scenario is provided to assist in planning for capabilities to build additional new forces to help preclude or respond to any future hostile adversary who might threaten U.S./allied interests on a global scale. The overarching aims for reconstitution strategy, and objectives for reconstitution programming, are set forth in DPG Sections II.D. and IV.B.